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Law, Society, and Moral Order: Introduction to 
the Symposium 
Richard D. Schwartz* 
In the articles that follow, six legal scholars explore aspects 
of the relations between law and moral order. Their common in- 
terest in this topic coalesced during a six-week seminar entitled 
Law, Society, and Moral Order held at  Syracuse University in 
the summer of 1979 under the auspices of the National Endow- 
ment for the Humanities.' As convenor of the Syracuse Seminar, 
I will introduce the Symposium by describing in general terms 
the common conceptual framework within which these papers 
are located. 
Throughout the Symposium, law and moral order are 
treated as empirical phenomena. The term "law" applies broadly 
to the primary and secondary rules promulgated by appropriate 
authorities and to the activities by which these rules are adjudi- 
cated and implemented. The term "moral order" likewise refers 
to an empirical phenomenon: those interrelated beliefs concern- 
ing what is right and proper that are widely accepted within a 
given society. I t  is important to stress that in using these terms 
we imply no judgment as to whether or not a particular set of 
moral ideas accords with our own individual principles or with 
some larger universal truths. The term "moral" is used in much 
the same way as John Austin used "positive rn~rality, '~ to desig- 
nate "opinions or sentiments held or felt by men in regard to 
human ~onduct."~ The same meaning attaches to such related 
words as mores, moral ideas, and norms. As we use them, all of 
these terms describing elements of morality refer to what the 
people of a given society (or subset of the society) think is right, 
* Ernest I. White Professor of Law and Professor of Sociology, Maxwell School, 
Syracuse University. 
1. The seminar was one of a series called Summer Seminars for Law Teachers held 
in 1977-79. It was supported by National Endowment for the Humanities Grant No. FP- 
34828-78-1357. 
2. J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES OF THE 
STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE 125 (1954). 
3. Id. at 123. 
722 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I980 
not to the value judgments of the observers. 
How do law and moral order, thus defined, affect each 
other? On the basis of current knowledge, we cannot expect a 
comprehensive answer to this question. The goals of the partici- 
pants in this Symposium are more modest. We want only to 
understand the nature and importance of the question and to 
begin working on some of its manageable components. 
In the discussion that follows, I shall try to convey my own 
perception of this theme as presented during the Syracuse Semi- 
nar. My remarks will not cover all of the materials, nor will they 
comprise an exact description of the position I presented at that 
time, much less a consensus adopted by the group. We engaged 
during that summer in a very lively set of discussions. Then and 
since, we have differed, argued, learned, and arrived at new posi- 
tions. Yet we share an enduring concern about common issues 
whose exploration we consider important. In this introduction I 
will state these issues as I see them and discuss a few of the 
scholarly writings which helped us come to grips with them. 
First, however, I wish to explain why I consider the inquiry 
important. 
The survival of open societies,' especially in the presence of 
technological means capable of easily disrupting order, may well 
depend on the mutually supportive interaction of law and moral 
order. Let me state the position starkly. In our kind of society 
law and moral order depend on each other. Unless compatible 
with moral order, law risks rejection; without law, moral order 
conducive to an open society cannot be sustained. At the ex- 
treme, the very structure of the open society disintegrates if law 
and moral order nullify each other. 
The same idea can be put more cautiously. Complex socie- 
ties in the modem world do not easily maintain equilibrium. 
That is observable. A possible explanation may be found by ex- 
amining the relationship between law and moral order. Deter- 
mining how well or poorly they support each other may well be 
the key to stability in an open society. 
As a first approximation, the proposed explanation can be 
phrased in the following terms: Lacking the shared understand- 
4. I use the term "open society" aa it is used in K. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND 
ITS ENEMIES 173 (rev. ed. 1966). 
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ings of traditional societies, modern nation-states require effec- 
tive mechanisms for generating and maintaining consensus. 
Many complex societies, including our own, have looked to the 
law to achieve these ends. The success of law as an integrative 
force seems to depend on a close and complex interaction with 
the moral order of society. To contribute to integration and sta- 
bility, law must draw from, align itself with, and contribute to 
moral order. Where this relationship falters, law may be dis- 
credited as an instrument for the conclusive resolution of dis- 
putes, a source of justice, the repository of authority, and a 
guide for behavior. If the partnership of law and moral order 
fails, two alternatives to open society become more likely: chaos 
(openness without society) and authoritarianism (society with- 
out openness). 
During the past quarter century, many nations have been 
subject to instability bordering on chaos. Argentina, for example, 
has gone through a series of crises of authority which have en- 
gendered a succession of troubled military regimes, each employ- 
ing repressive measures, but unable to cope with armed bands 
using terroristic methods to fight for dominance. Comparable 
problems are found elsewhere in Latin America, Africa, and 
Asia. The tragic situation in Lebanon, traceable initially to con- 
stitutional "di~sensus,"~ continues to defy solution. Several 
Western European nations and the United States have also 
faced periods of spectacular civil unrest and in some cases ter- 
roristic activities, although they have been able to avoid regime 
changes during the post-World War I1 period. 
Disorders of this kind have led in the past toward authorita- 
rian rule. The classic example is that of Hitler's rise in Nazi Ger- 
many following the chaotic period of the Weimar Republic. Al- 
though the dynamics of the Weimar era defy neat diagnosis, it is 
clear that the liberties accorded under the Republic encouraged 
the expression of enormously diverse ideas concerning every 
moral, political, religious, and cultural question. The extent to 
which the resultant confusion may have contributed to a drive 
toward, in Erich Fromm's phrase, an "escape from freedom" 
bears some consideration. 
Wherever orderly open societies become chaotic or authori- 
tarian, explanations are needed but not easily given. Argentina's 
5. The term "dissensus" as used here refers to the opposite of consensus, whatever 
the reason. 
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continuing problem is difficult to trace, for a clear end is not in 
view. The story of Weimar's thirteen years is accessible history, 
however, and gives rise to important questions: Did the Weimar 
institutions of law and government in any way contribute to the 
coalescence of a moral order that might have provided a societal 
basis of support for the Republic? Or did they instead exacer- 
bate the chaos and even contribute to a moral order consistent 
with Nazism? Where were the judges, the lawmakers, the law- 
yers, and the legal thinkers as the open society of Weimar 
faltered? If similar dangers face our own society, even remotely, 
should we not be asking comparable questions? What lessons 
can be learned from the Weimar experience that might be ap- 
plied to contemporary open societies? 
As scholars and citizens interested in the law, it is impor- 
tant for us to know how legal institutions may affect the expres- 
sion, dissemination, and acceptance of moral ideas in complex 
societies such as our own. In the face of moral dissensus, what 
can law do toward resolving disputes and integrating society? 
Law, broadly defined, can (but does not necessarily) con- 
tribute to moral order. I t  can bring together individuals or 
groups initially opposed, calling on them to settle their differ- 
ences in mutually satisfactory ways. It can generate procedural 
and substantive norms to guide judicial and administrative deci- 
sions with the possibility that these norms might gain societal 
acceptance as normative standards. It can provide access for cit- 
izen participation in the processes of lawmaking and administra- 
tion (e.g., through legislatures or juries) and thereby heighten 
the chance that the resultant legal norms will be consistent with 
and absorbed into the moral order. It can accompany these con- 
tributions to normative coalescence with policies aflirming the 
principle, already embedded in the legal subculture, that where 
we cannot agree we can g e e  to disagree, to tolerate, to endure 
our differences and our disadvantages in the interest of main- 
taining an open and tolerably equitable fabric of society. 
On the other hand, law can exacerbate problems of conflict 
and dissensus. In the midst of social conflict, it can favor one 
side to an extent that alienates the other. If law appears to be 
steadily antagonistic to a group in society, that group may ques- 
tion the legitimacy of the system of justice and, accordingly, the 
entire authority of the government. If equilibrium depends on 
the balance among many discontented groups, the social fabric 
may be torn by withdrawal, alienation, crime, and violent pro- 
7211 INTRODUCTION 725 
test. Escalating political violence can threaten the very organiza- 
tion of the society, whether the opposing forces polarize against 
each other (as in El Salvador) or coalesce (as in Iran's Islamic 
revolution). 
By the time a regime reaches the stage of rebellion, it is 
generally too late. The question for us is whether, before such 
conflicts become acute, law can help to resolve them in a manner 
that allays discontent and promotes acceptance and support. 
The first effort by the Symposium participants to approach 
the topic of law and moral order made use of the famous debate 
between Professors H.L.A. Harte and Lon L. Fuller.' In their ex- 
change, the issue of law and morality came to the center of juris- 
prudential attention. If we focus primarily on their assertions 
about reality, their positions do not directly oppose each other. 
Hart asserted that law need not embody all of the moral senti- 
ments of society (making clear at the same time that he hoped it 
would not)? Fuller expressed the view that law does in fact em- 
body moral sentiments, derived to some extent from the nature 
and requirements of the society.@ Analytically, these positions 
could both be correct. Hart does not deny that some moral sen- 
timents are reflected in the law and Fuller does not insist that 
all moral sentiments of society are incorporated into law. Why 
then do they differ so fundamentally. 
Hart and Fuller both start with a fundamental agree- 
ment-that law has an existence of its own, distinguishable from 
the societal morality.'O Hart is concerned that the distinction be 
preserved so that immoral laws can be better identified and re- 
formed and so that law not be overused for implementing all of 
society's morality. Fuller also recognizes the differences between 
the ideas of goodness in society and rightness in law. But he sees 
good law and a coherent morality as mutually supportive.ll His 
6. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Lcrw and Morals, 71 HAW. L. REV. 593 
(1958). 
7. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: a Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. 
REV. 630 (1958). 
8. Hart, supra note 6, at 613-14. 
9. Fuller, supra note 7, at 642. 
10. Fuller's phrase "fidelity to law" refera to both the legality of official behavior 
and societal acceptance of law. For that reason, I have avoided using the phrase in this 
brief discussion of Fuller. 
11. [Tlhe authority to make law must be supported by moral attitudes that 
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ultimate focus is on the internal morality of law-those general 
procedural principles such as generality, clarity, consistency, sta- 
bility, fair warning, and code-consistent administration so viv- 
idly discussed in The Morality of Law? It is this morality 
which he believes to be intimately interrelated with society. 
Fuller's idea of interrelationship is a subtle one. The inter- 
nal morality of law is a product not only of the legal institution 
but also of the society. The influence from society does not oc- 
cur, however, primarily by the transmission of well-developed 
ideas of rightness, from society to law. The internal morality of 
law is a response not to preexistent mores but to the functional 
requirements which law must meet to operate successfully in the 
society. If a legal system is to be accepted as legitimate it must 
be administered in a manner that preserves societal acceptance. 
Otherwise, Fuller says, law cannot serve successfully as a regula- 
tor of behavior and an integrative force. The model is not that 
societal morality leads to law; rather that societal need for co- 
herent law leads to internal morality of law which in turn leads 
to societal acceptance of law. 
Fuller does not deal in detail with the effect of legal (i.e., 
internal) morality on the mores, a major question for us. His dis- 
cussion nevertheless suggests that the internal morality might 
diffuse into and be accepted by the society and its institutions. 
Later work by Fullerla and others1' has picked up on that 
theme. 
Fuller's formulation implies that the societal requirements 
reflected in the internal morality of law characterize all social 
systems. Although his model may well describe the situation in 
complex open societies, it does not seem to cover the relation 
between law and society where moral order is more cohesive and 
accord to it the competency it claims. Here we are dealing with a morality 
external to law, which makes law poesible. But this alone is not enough. . . . 
We still cannot have law until our [hypothetical lawmaker] is ready to accept 
the internal morality of law itself. 
In the life of a nation these external and internal moralities of law recipro- 
cally Suence one another, a deterioration of the one will almost invariably 
produce a deterioration in the other. 
Fuller, supra note 7, at 645. 
12. L. FULLER, THE MORALFIN OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969). 
13. See L. FULLER, ANATOW OF THE LAW (1968): Nler ,  Human Interaction and the 
Law, 14 AM. J. JURIS. 1 (1969); Fuller, Lcuv as an Instrument of Social Control and Law 
as a Facilitation of Human Interaction, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REV. 89. 
14. E.g., S. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS (1974); P. SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, 
AND INDUSTRUL JUSTICE 3-34 (1969). 
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legal institutions are less fully developed. In the simplest socie- 
ties, law does not exist as a differentiated institution.16 Where it 
does emerge, its form is likely to be meditative rather than au- 
thoritative and its content is heavily influenced by the pervasive 
mores of the society. Accordingly, it does not need the formal 
properties (such as generality, consistency) which may be re- 
quired in complex societies. 
In order to gain perspective on the relations of law and mo- 
rality, the Syracuse Seminar examined the role of law in a range 
of societies from simple to complex. The examination of legal 
systems on that dimension helps to identify the potential signifi- 
cance of pervasive mores (such as are found in simple societies) 
in affecting legal structure and content. It illuminates the partic- 
ular importance of Fuller-type procedural principles where per- 
vasive mores are lacking, as they are in most complex societies. 
The internal morality of law might there provide, at least in 
part, a synthetic alternative or functional equivalent to the mo- 
res of simpler societies. 
We began our comparative examination of other societies by 
reading Roberto Unger's Law in Modern Society.16 His work 
stressed the way in which culture and social structure affect the 
type of legal system that develops in a given society. Although 
our interest was directed primarily to his comparative-historical 
analysis, we also noted his stress on the significance of legal- 
order law in providing legitimacy to westem-type societies. We 
did not share his conclusion, however, that such societies are 
doomed to progressive deterioration by the undermining of gen- 
erality and uniformity in their legal systems.17 We accepted such 
results as possible, but not inevitable. 
Unger distinguishes western law (which he describes as "le- 
gal-order law") from two other "ideal types" or models of law: 
customary and bureaucratic.18 "Customary law" is Unger's term 
for what we described as moral norms or mores. Not the product 
of a political entity, customary law is the prevailing or exclusive 
15. See Schwartz & Miller, Legal Evolution and Societal Complexity, 60 AM. J .  
SOC. 159, 166 (1964). 
16. R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY (1976). 
17. Id. at 193-200. 
18. Id. at 54-56. 
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way in which norms of behavior are expressed in simple societies 
and in other societies dominated by tradition. It is a set of be- 
liefs common to an entire society and is "made of implicit stan- 
dards of conduct rather than of formulated rules."la In this re- 
gard, customary law differs from state-made law of either the 
bureaucratic or legal-order type since these latter bodies of law 
are "public" (governmental) and "positive" (formally articu- 
lated). Legal-order law differs from bureaucratic law in "its at- 
tachment to the aims of generality and uniformity in adjudica- 
tion. . . . Administration must be separated from legislation to 
insure generality; adjudication must be distinguished from ad- 
ministration to safeguard ~niformity."~~ In fulfilling these char- 
acteristics, legal-order law tends to be administered by courts 
which are insulated from the other branches of government. 
Unger examines a number of ancient societies (Chinese, 
Japanese, Hindu, Moslem, Judaic, and Greco-Roman) and tries 
to explain the reasons for legal-order law emerging (as he con- 
tends) in none of them." Turning to Western Europe, he finds 
that legal-order law emerged there because of the combination 
of two distinctive circumstances: one social-structural, the other 
ideological. These he describes, respectively, as (1) the alliance 
of bourgeoisie and princes against the feudal nobles2% and (2) the 
widespread belief that one supreme, transcendent God bespoke 
the reality of a single moral standard which must be reflected in 
universalistic, general laws." 
Unger's analysis contributed several ideas to the Seminar, 
two of which were particularly important. First, he illustrated 
the manner in which social structure and culture might affect 
the nature and content of law. Whether or not his specific fac- 
tors provide a satisfactory explanation, the method of relating 
these societal features to the legal system is plausible. It serves 
to illustrate a possible relationship-society determining law- 
which brings vividness to the abstract proposition. Secondly, 
Unger's description of customary law directed attention toward 
those societies in which moral order is so well established, perva- 
sive, and uniform that separate legal institutions find no place. 
By examining folk societies, those attending the Seminar were 
19. Id. at 50. 
20. Id. at 53-54. 
21. Id. at 110-20. 
22. Id. at 74-76. 
23. Id. at 83. 
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able to appreciate the importance of moral order in simple socie- 
ties and to examine the significance for complex societies and 
their legal systems or moral heterogeneity. 
IV. ETHNOGRAPHIES 
Malinowski's classic work on the Melanesians of the Trobri- 
and Archipelago? which examines social order in a society with 
simple technology, minimal division of labor and face-to-face re- 
lationships, provided a good empirical starting point. In such 
simple societies, the absence of formal legal structure seems at- 
tributable, at least in part, to the success of other means for de- 
fining and maintaining what is perceived to be proper conduct. 
Primary reliance is placed on a system of well-understood, mu- 
tually-reinforcing norms. These are reinforced by the continu- 
ous, well-ordered, interlocking systems of exchange which re- 
ward the participants. A byproduct of this well-established 
system of reciprocities is the availability of sanctions which, in 
the event of a failure to Eulfill obligations, can readily be used by 
withdrawal of cooperation. These sanctions are rarely invoked, 
however, because of the success of the prevailing pattern of or- 
derly social relations. Abstractly described here, this pattern can 
be far better comprehended as the reader joins Malinowski in 
watching the crew of a canoe carrying out their different tasks in 
catching fish in a New Guinea lagoon, dividing the catch, and 
exchanging some of the fish for vegetables supplied by the in- 
land villagers? 
Malinowski and other ethnographers help to understand the 
forms of social control in simple societies when the pattern of 
order is violated. Because the norms are clear and pervasive, 
they are readily invoked and socially supported. In a widely 
cited case among the Trobrianders, a publicly shamed violater of 
the incest taboo commits ceremonial suicide.ae Among the Es- 
kimo, another good example of a folk society, even the control of 
recidivist murder is handled ad hoc-typically through the so- 
cially approved execution of the offender by a close relativeOB7 
Such mechanisms of social control are understood and sup- 
24. B. MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY (1951). 
25. Id. at 18-27. 
26. Id. at 77-80. 
27. For summaries of relevant ethnographies, we used E. HOEBEL, THE LAW OF 
PRMTIVE MAN (1954). 
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ported by a pervasive consensus of the society. In such situa- 
tions, a specialization in the control function is absent for two 
reasons: a low degree of specialization and a moral order with 
clear norms and adequate sanctions not requiring administration 
by specialists. 
This uncomplicated method of social control rarely persists 
in pure form beyond the simplest societies. With more efficient 
technology, the complexity of social organization increases and 
greater specialization emerges. In societies just beyond the sub- 
sistence stage, specialization in dispute resolution takes the form 
of mediation, carried out by persons explicitly recognized in per- 
forming this role. Characteristically, this occurs in societies with 
a symbolic means of exchange and a practice of dealing with dis- 
putes by compensating the victim through the payment of dam- 
ages? In such societies, mediation sometimes is done not by a 
single mediator but by a council of elders. Where this occurs, 
there is a tendency for the third-party role to convert from find- 
ing a mutually satisfactory settlement point to declaring the 
proper settlement. 
Both the mediator and the council in such societies draw 
heavily on the pervasive mores of the society. Sharing a common 
culture, the third parties accomplish their task by using stan- 
dards shared throughout the society. The force of their decisions 
is enhanced by the familiarity of the society's moral standards 
guiding their advice or decision. The literature of legal ethnogra- 
phy contains many striking examples of this close relationship. 
Among the best known of these are descriptions of the dispute- 
resolving work of the Ifugao Monkalun (go-between)? the 
Nuer's Leopard Skin Chief? the Soldier Societies of the Chey- 
enne;l and the Kpelle Moot.8s 
The mediation systems of such societies seem to fit easily 
the concept of law advanced by Paul Bohannan as reinstitution- 
a l i~a t ion .~~  An ethnographer himself, Bohannan had seen in his 
28. See Schwartz & Miller, supra note 15, at 160-61 & 11.14. 
29. Barton, Ifugao Law, 15 AM. ARCHEOLOGY AND ETHNOLOGY 1 (1919). 
30. E. EVANS--HARD, THE NUER (1940). 
31. K. LLEWELLYN & E. HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY (1941). 
32. Gibbs, The Kpelle Moot, in LAW AND WARFARE 277-79 (P. Bohannan ed. 1967). 
33. Bohannan, The Differing Realms of the Law, in The Ethnography of Law 33, 
34-37 (supp. to 67 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST (1965)). 
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study of the Tivs4 the operation of a distinctive legal institution 
whose functioning in relation to custom he thought could be 
generalized. He saw all law performing the function of setting 
straight those disputes or difficulties which arise in the other in- 
stitutions of societ ie~.~~ Legal institutions have the task of set- 
tling such disputes where they cannot be satisfactorily managed 
at their place of origin. In order to do so, the legal institutions 
must disengage the dispute from its original institutional setting, 
deal with it within the new context of legal procedure, and then 
return the matter to whence it came." If it is successful, this 
procedure provides a redefinition of the norm which is more pre- 
cise and more authoritative than the custom. The process also 
generates a gap between law and custom, according to Bohan- 
nan, setting up a tension in which each normative system is 
pulled toward the other without ever becoming identical. The 
gap is inevitable, he teUs us, and it performs a useful function in 
that it is a source of adaptive change." 
Bohannan's concept presupposes, however, that there exists 
a substantial degree of correspondence between the mores or 
customs and the corresponding law. In simple societies, this 
overlap derives from the uniformity of the culture. If the norms 
of such a culture are pervasive, they will be known to and ac- 
cepted by those who mediate, arbitrate, or adjudicate. Inevitably 
in those circumstances, the gap between mores and law will be 
limited precisely because the law uses the norm of the society as 
the starting point and guideline for the legal norm. Some limit 
to the gap may be needed if the legal institution is to retain its 
general legitimacy, its capacity to settle disputes, the social sup- 
port needed for the implementation of specific decisions, and the 
ability to contribute normative content in its own right. Yet, in 
simple societies, the latter requirement may not constitute a 
heavy burden. It is precisely because law draws so heavily on a 
well developed, widely accepted set of mores that it need not 
add much to those mores. 
As societies become more complex, however, this model 
seems increasingly distant from the way law functions. In proto- 
states, such as the Ashanti of West Africa, the institutions of law 
and government were used at least in part td bulwark the inter- 
34. P. BOHANNAN, JUSTICE AND JUDGEMENT AMONG THE TIV (1957). 
35. Bohannan, supra note 33, at 35. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 37. 
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est of the rulers to tax and to conscript workers and soldiers. In 
that instance it is possible to trace historically the changes 
which occurred as the Ashanti state consolidated its power. Dis- 
pute resolution, largely mediative before the rise of the state, 
became increasingly punitive. Capital punishment was pre- 
scribed for many offenses. When imposed, it also served as a 
source of revenue to the state since the condemned person's 
property was forfeited. These developments were not merely 
reinstitutionalizations of the basic mores of the society. While 
the Ashanti rulers drew on the symbols of the folk culture, they 
built institutions and laws which imposed rules on the society as 
much as they drew on its mores to formulate the laws." 
Proto-states of this kind make clear that the institutions of 
law and government do not necessarily implement the preexis- 
tent mores. Where interests diverge and where power is concen- 
trated, law can obviously become an instrument for imposing on 
the many who are weak the interests of the few who are strong. 
If such a regime establishes itself, an equilibrium creating pro- 
cess may develop, however, in which the laws and mores influ- 
ence each other in a manner which closes the gap. 
None of these models seems to apply very well to our own 
society-a society characterized by such heterogeneity that it 
has few pervasive mores governing specific behaviors. It is in fact 
the striking feature of this society, and of many western-style 
societies like it, that the differences in norms across groups are 
more numerous than the similarities. The state in such societies 
has not been available, as among the Ashanti,nto enforce compli- 
ance with a detailed set of standards through an imbalance of 
power. Rather, a norm of toleration authorizes the expression of 
a wide range of ideas concerning what is right. In these circum- 
stances, normative diversity of all kinds has flourished. 
The law of course cannot readily take its guidance from a 
system of pervasive mores where none exists. The Bohannan 
model thus clearly will not fit our circumstances. On the other 
hand, the state does not typically impose measures which are 
utterly contrary to the mores, either. Our situation is thus a 
mixed one in which neither the state nor the mores clearly domi- 
nate. The state is limited in its capacity to dominate because its 
38. The standard work is T. F ? , A ~ Y ,  ASHANTI LAW AND CONSTITUTION (1929). The 
. seminar used the account given in E. HOEBBL, THB LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN (1954), and 
the discussion of Ashanti and Dahomey in Diamond, The Rule of Law and the Order of 
Custom, in THE RULE OF LAW (R. WOW ed. 1971). 
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legitimacy rests on the belief that it governs fairly on behalf of 
all the people. The maintenance of this fundamental norm de- 
pends to some extent, however, on a rough correspondence (i.e., 
a limited gap) between law and mores. Mores do not give much 
guidance, because they are so sparse, scattered, or controversial 
that they usually cannot shape the substance of laws. Such 
mores as we have tend to emerge as a synthetic product of the 
interaction between law and society. 
VI. LAW AND MORAL ORDER IN COMPLEX SOCIETIES 
The capacity of law in complex societies to contribute to 
moral consensus (or lack therof) deserves close attention. How 
does a society, lacking pervasive mores spontaneously derived 
from a traditional culture, a uniform social system, or an author- 
itarian government, achieve the minimal agreement it needs to 
maintain order and continue functioning? When unified action 
is needed to meet a challenge to a complex society's most basic 
interests, what mechanisms are available for drawing its mem- 
bers together? If dissensus and malfunction persist and increase, 
when do they reach the point where they generate a dramatic 
change comparable to the revitalization movements found in 
simpler societies? 
What, if anything, can the institutions of law and govern- 
ment contribute toward the consolidation of the required mini- 
mum of moral order in a heterogeneous, open society? To what 
extent can the legal norms express, synthesize, and contribute to 
a pervasive set of mores? When the Supreme Court refers to 
"the evolving standards of decency that characterize the pro- 
gress of a maturing society," does it see itself playing a role in 
that evolutionary process? Does such a potential exist, and if so, 
how is it realized? 
The participants in the Syracuse Seminar gave serious 
thought to these questions. The nature of the problem was 
elucidated by the use of a range of materials, drawing from 
biology, economics, political science, sociology, anthropology, 
psychology, philosophy, history, and jurisprudence. We found 
works readily available which seemed to contribute particularly 
well to the search for an adequate formulation of the problem. 
(In addition to those mentioned, I should add Scheingold's The 
Politics of Rights:@ Piaget's The Moral Judgment of the 
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Child,'O and Walster's work on equity theory)." Finding solu- 
tions was another matter. 
We agreed to search the available literature looking for an- 
swers to the major crucial questions. How, to take a central is- 
sue, might the law affect the evolution of the mores? I had re- 
cently completed an article on capital punishment while 
thinking about this question." The article suggested that the 
Georgia capital punishment statute upheld by the Supreme 
Court in Gregg v. Georgia4s presented a pattern that would aid 
the society to reach consensus-to evolve its mores-as to when 
and where the death penalty was unacceptable. The process out- 
lined in Gregg involved a partnership between the society (as 
represented by the aggregate behavior of juries), the legislature 
(in specifying aggravating circumstances), the trial judges (in 
guiding the exercise of jury discretion), and the Supreme Court 
of Georgia (in monitoring capital sentences to determine 
whether capital punishment had been imposed in comparable 
cases). This procedure had led to a holding that capital punish- 
ment was unconstitutional in rape cases because it was so rarely 
administered." The same procedure could lead to a similar con- 
clusion regarding use of the death penalty for murder, if juries 
so indicate by the aggregate of their decisions over a range of 
comparable cases. In other words, the courts may have provided 
a framework within which the society can evolve its own mores 
on a very basic question. Compared with the legislative process, 
this framework might better isolate issues, intensify experience, 
and have more profound effects for the moral order. 
While such a study illustrates one possible interaction be- 
tween law and the mores, it can at  best be only a start toward 
enumerating the ways in which these normative systems can in- 
fluence each other. My colleagues in the Syracuse Seminar de- 
cided to look in detail at  specific topics in an effort to use and 
refine the common perspective. 
The results of several of those inquiries are presented in 
this Symposium. In addition to the authors whose articles are 
40. J. PIAGET, HE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (1965). 
41. Walster, Berscheid, & Walster, New Directions in Equity Research, in EQm 
THEORY 1-42 (L. Berkowitz & E. Walster eds. 1976). 
42. Schwartz, The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment: A Quest for Balance 
Between Legal and Societal Morality, 1 LAW & POL'Y Q. 285 (1979). 
43. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
44. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Coley v. Georgia, 231 Ga. 829,204 S.E.2d 
612 (1974). 
7211 INTRODUCTION 735 
published here, significant contributions to the Syracuse Semi- 
nar were also made by James Vach6, Robert Waters, and Alex- 
ander Williams. John Cole not only participated valuably in the 
original seminar, but also delivered a paper at  the oral sympo- 
sium held during October 1980 in Arizona and Utah. 
Cole's paper, which he intends to prepare for a later publi- 
cation, has already contributed substantially to the thinking of 
the Syracuse Seminar. He argues that the law can most effec- 
tively contribute toward normative consensus not by deciding 
disputes on principle, but by compromising in the settlement of 
disputes in a manner which accommodates different points of 
view. In this manner, says Cole, law can best "keep the peace in 
society so that progress toward consensus can be carried on by 
other  institution^.'"^ Cole treats the decision in Bakkey disap- 
pointing to many commentators because of its undefinitive na- 
ture, as an illustration of how he thinks law at its best operates. 
The other papers delivered at the Arizona and Utah sympo- 
sia are presented here in written form. I shall not seek to sum- 
marize them for those readers who already have them. Suffice it 
to say that they cover a range of views. The authors differ in the 
extent to which they think the courts can develop and imple- 
ment authoritative principles or specific policies (cf. Baker and 
Diamond). One expresses concern with the consequences of a 
large gap between moral sentiments of wide segments of the so- 
ciety and judicial decisions in the abortion area (Wardle). Each 
of these papers to some extent sounds a warning concerning the 
limits of what the courts can do, cautioning against the conse- 
quences of overreaching efforts (Wardle) or (in Diamond's case) 
unrealistic expectations and the resultant failure to seek alterna- 
tive, more effective modes of effectuating change. 
While not disputing these cautions, some of the papers pro- 
pose methods by which the disjunction between law and moral 
order might be reduced. Bacigal finds such a mechanism within 
the reach of judicial decision making, if the Court would provide 
the jury in search and seizure cases with a larger role in deter- 
mining normative standards. 
Rich moves from the courts to an emphasis on lawyers. He 
argues that instead of relying unduly on the courts and the ad- 
45. J. Cole, Law and the Accomodating Principle 2 (unpublished preliminary draft 
manuscript in possession of author). 
46. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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versary relations they promote, the legal profession could aid in 
dispute resolution more systematically than it does at present by 
contributing to constructive compromise as "lawyer for the situ- 
ation." Such a role might not lead so much to the formulation of 
specific substantive norms as it does to a more general procedu- 
ral norm. In a society where substantive standards and interests 
vary so widely, the acceptance of dispute resolving procedures 
may comprise the best prospect in many situations for an agreed 
upon norm: Resolve your differences! The suggestion, in effect, is 
that our specialists in dispute resolution learn from the 
mediators of simpler societies. Rich's proposals are consistent in 
this regard not only with the recent literature by legal anthro- 
pologists, whom he cites, but also with the little noticed Dispute 
Resolution Act of 1980:7 which provides aid to localities for ten- 
ters set up to facilitate informal methods of dispute resolution. 
Agrait's contribution reminds us that some important ways 
for dealing with the moral order problem may be found in the 
organization of society itself. His inquiry is directed to those as- 
pects of social organization which inhibit effective participation 
in community and government. His specific proposals for the 
restoration of units that foster participation are intrinsically in- 
teresting. The article also suggests that a knowledge of all the 
institutions of society is needed for a thorough understanding of 
the possible ways in which law can affect the moral order by 
which it is, in turn, inevitably affected. In this regard, Agrait 
reminds us of the Durkheirnian emphasis on social structures, 
beyond but affected by the institutions of law and government, 
as potential generators of norms and reinforcers of moral order. 
In its own way, each paper illustrates a very different ap- 
proach to the central problem. Although no organized program 
of policy or research can yet be discerned, these initial efforts 
indicate the significance of the theme in a wide range of subject- 
matter areas. How and whether such diverse applications will 
eventually be drawn together remains to be seen. 
In bringing this introduction to a close, I would like to ex- 
press, for myself and my colleagues in this work, thanks to sev- 
eral who helped to make the Symposium possible. Dean Craig 
W. Christensen and Vice Chancellor John James Prucha of Syr- 
acuse University welcomed and facilitated the original Seminar. 
The National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) gave gen- 
47. Dispute Resolution Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-190, 94 Stat. 17. 
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erously to support the original Seminar. The grant was extended 
to facilitate a planning conference looking toward the Sympo- 
sium. Particular thanks are due to Mort Sosna and Paul von 
Blum, staff members of NEH during the planning and conduct 
of the Seminar. Though less directly involved, Julian McDonald 
and April Hall of NEH generously added their support. At Syra- 
cuse, excellent administrative assistance came from the Office of 
Sponsored Programs, under the direction of William Wilson. 
The grant itself was efficiently managed by W. Howard Hough 
and Dona Sobotka. Administrative details were handled capably 
by Gretchen Goldstein and Molly Spear. Resourceful research 
assistance was provided during the Seminar by Linda Paez, then 
a second-year law student. 
The oral symposia, held in Tempe, Arizona and Provo, Utah 
in October 1980 were arranged by one of our colleagues, Profes- 
sor Lynn Wardle. His initiative, organization, and judgment 
made these symposia possible. Thanks are also due to the orga- 
nizations and leaders who provided grants, sponsorship, and fa- 
cilities. In Arizona, generous assistance was provided by Lor- 
raine Frank, Executive Director, Arizona Humanities Council; 
Ilene Lachinsky, Director of Continuing Legal Education, State 
Bar of Arizona; and Dean Alan Matheson, Arizona State Univer- 
sity College of Law. In Utah, parallel aid came through the cour- 
tesy of Delmont Oswald, Executive Director, Utah Endowment 
for the Humanities; Dean Sheffield, Executive Director, Utah 
State Bar, and Dean Rex E. Lee, J. Reuben Clark Law School, 
Brigham Young University. 
Intellectual contributions came from several scholars. The 
Syracuse Seminar benefited from exceptional sessions conducted 
at  Syracuse by Professor Samuel J.M. Donnelly, who discussed 
the jurisprudence of Rawls and Dworkin, and Dr. Richard W. 
Rabinowitz, who discussed Japanese culture and law in light of 
his twenty-five years of law practice in Japan. 
The oral symposia provided us with the first systematic 
comments on the papers presented in this Symposium issue. We 
had the benefit of discussions by eighteen panelists, all of whom 
. carried out their assignments carefully. Responses to the papers, 
sometimes vigorously critical, were remarkably insightful and 
creative. Several of the papers included in this Symposium have 
been modified to meet the criticisms or use the suggestions of 
the panelists. To all of the panelists, we express our sincere ap- 
preciation for their valuable help. They seriously performed a 
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critical function for us at a level of quality rarely seen in aca- 
demic dis~ourse.'~ 
It is obvious from the foregoing account that many have 
contributed toward making this Symposium possible. Most im- 
portant of all, from my point of view, are the ten law professors 
who joined with me in the summer of 1979 to begin a coopera- 
tive inquiry which continues to the present. Their interest and 
intelligence have added much to my understanding. It is a great 
satisfaction to know that, through this Symposium issue, others 
will be able to benefit as well from their current thinking. 
48. The panelists in Arizona on October 22 and 23, 1980 were: 
Michael F. Bailey, Esq. Brown & Bain 
Hon. James Duke Cameron Chief Justice, Supreme Court of 
Arizona 
Richard A. Cosgrove Assoc. Professor of History 
University of Arizona 
John Paul Frank, Esq. Lewis & Roca 
David H. Kaye Professor of Law 
Arizona State University 
Jeffrie Murphy Professor of Philosophy 
University of Arizona 
Hon. Sandra D. O'Connor Associate Justice 
Arizona Court of Appeals 
Mark Pastin Professor of Philosophy 
Arizona State University 
Panelists in Utah on October 24 and 25, 1980 were: 
Dean James Clayton Professor of History 
University of Utah 
Robert Dalton Professor of Philosophy 
Dixie College 
Cole Durham Professor of Law 
Brigham Young University 
Hon. Christine Durham Judge, Third Dist. Court of 
the State of Utah 
Dean Martin Hickman Professor of Government 
Brigham Young University 
Hon. Monroe McKay Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, 
10th Circuit 
Merlin Myers Professor of Anthropology 
Brigham Young University 
Douglas Parker Professor of Law 
Brigham Young University 
Levi Peterson Professor of Comparative 
Literature 
Weber State College 
Noel Reynolds Professor of Government 
Brigham Young University 
Eugene Woolf Professor of Philosophy 
Southern Utah State College 
